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THE GENERAL IDEAS OF INFANTS AND
DEAF-MUTES/
BY PROF. TH. RIBOT.
WE are concerned with children who have not yet learned to
speak, and with such alone. In contradistinction to ani-
mals, and to deaf-mutes when left to themselves, infancy repre-
sents a transitory state of which no upper limit can be fixed, seeing
that speech appears progressively. The child forms his baby-
vocabulary little by little, and at first imposes it upon others, until
such time as he is made to learn the language of his country. We
may provisionally neglect this period of transition, studying only
the dumb, or monosyllabic and gesture phase.
The problem proposed at the end of the seventeenth century
(perhaps before), and dividing the philosophers into two camps,
was whether the human individual starts with general terms, or
with particulars. At a later time, the question was proposed for
the human race as a whole, in reference to the origin of language.
Locke maintained the thesis of the particular: "The ideas
that children form of the persons with whom they converse resem-
ble the persons themselves, and can only be particular."
So, too, Condillac, Adam Smith, Dugald Stewart, and the
majority of those who represent the so-called sensationalist school.
The thesis of the general was upheld by authors of no less au-
thority, commencing with Leibnitz:
"Children and those who are ill-acquainted with the language
they desire to speak, or the matter whereof they discourse, make
use of general terms, such as thing, animal, plant, in lieu of the
proper terms which are wanting to them ; and it is certain that all
proper or individual names were originally appellative or general. " -
1 Translated from the French by Frances A. Welby.
2 l^ouveaux Essais, Book III., Chapter I.
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The problem cannot be accepted under this form by contem-
porary psychology. It is equivocal. Its capital error is in apply-
ing to the embryonic state of intelligence and of language, formulae
that are appropriate to adult life only—to the growing mind, cate-
gories valid for the formed intellect alone. A reference to the
physiology of the human embryo will render this more intelligible.
Has this embryo, up to three months, a nose or mouth ? Is it male
or female? etc. Students of the development of intra-uterine life
in its first phases are very cautious in propounding these and simi-
lar questions in such a manner; they do not admit of definite an-
swers. That which is in the state of development and of incessant
becoming, can only be compared remotely with that which is fixed
and developed.
The sole permissible formula is this : Intelligence progresses
from the indefinite to the definite. If "indefinite" is taken as
synonymous with general, it may be said that the particular does
not appear at the outset ; but neither does the general in any exact
sense : the vague would be more appropriate. In other words, no
sooner has the intellect progressed beyond the moment of percep-
tion and of its immediate reproduction in memory, than the generic
image makes its appearance, i. e., a state intermediate between
the particular and the general, participating in the nature of the
one and of the other—a confused simplification.
Recent works on the psychology of infancy abound in exam-
ples of these abstractions and inferior generalisations, which ap-
pear very early. ^ A few examples will suffice.
Preyer's child (aged thirty-one weeks) interested itself exclu-
sively in bottles, water-jugs, and other transparent vases with
white contents ; it had thus seized upon a characteristic mark of
one thing that was important to it, to-wit—milk. At a later period
it designated these by the syllable mom. Taine records an analo-
gous case of a child to whom ?nm and U7n, and then ;//>;/ at first sig-
nified the pleasure of seeing its pap, and subsequently everything
eatable. We are assisting at the genesis of the sign; the crude
sound attached to a group of objects becomes at a later period the
sign of those objects, and later still an instrument of substitution.
Sigismund showed his son, aged less than one year, and incapable
of pronouncing a single word, a stuffed grouse, saying "bird."
The child immediately looked across to the other side of the room
where there was a stuffed owl. Another child having listened first
ICf. Taine, V Intelligence, Vol. I., Book I., Chapter II., Part 2, Note i. (Prayer, Die Seele des
Kindes, Chapter XVI.;
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with its right ear, then with its left, to the ticking of a watch,
stretched out its arm gleefully towards the clock on the chimney-
piece (auditory, not vocal, generic image).
Without multiplying examples known to every one, which
give peremptory proof of the existence of abstraction (partial dis-
sociation), and of generalisation, prior to speech, let us rather
consider the heterogeneous nature of these generic images, the re-
sult of their mode of formation. They are in fact constructed
arbitrarily,—as it were by accident, depending partly on the ap-
prehension of gross resemblances, partly, and chiefly, on subjective
causes, emotional dispositions, practical interests. More rarely
they are based upon essential qualities.
John Stuart Mill affirms that the majority of animals divide
everything into two categories: that which is, and that which is
not, edible. Whatever we may think of this assertion, we should
probably feel much astonishment if we could penetrate and com-
prehend certain animal generalisations. In the case of children we
can do more than assume. Preyer's son employed the interjection
ass (which he had forged or imitated) first for his wooden horse,
mounted on wheels, and covered with hair ; next for everything
that could be displaced or that moved (carts, animals, his sister,
etc.), and that had hair. Taine's little girl (twelve months), who
had frequently been shown a copy of an infant Jesus, from Luini,
and had been told at the same time, "That is the baby," would in
another room, on hearing any one ask her, "Where is the baby?"
turn to any of the pictures or engravings, no matter what they
were. Baby signified to her some general thing: something which
she found in common in all these pictures, engravings of land-
scapes, and figures, i. e., if I do not mistake, some variegated ob-
ject in a shining frame. Darwin communicated the following
observation on one of his grandsons to Romanes :
"The child, who was just beginning to speak, called a duck
'quack,' and, by special association, it also called water 'quack.'
By an appreciation of the resemblance of qualities, it next ex-
tended the term 'quack' to denote all birds and insects on the one
hand, and all fluid substances on the other. Lastly, by a still
more delicate appreciation of resemblance, the child eventually
called all coins 'quack,' because on the back of a French sou it
had once seen the representation of an eagle. "^
In this case, to which we shall return later, there was a singu-
lar mixture of intellectual operations : creation of a word by ono-
1 Romanes, Mental Evolution in Man, p. 283.
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matopceia (resemblance) and finally an unbridled extension of
analogy.
Such observations might be multiplied. They would only con-
firm this remark: the generic image varies in one case and an-
other, because the condensation of resemblances of which it is con-
stituted depends often upon a momentary impression, upon most
unexpected conditions.
The development of numeration in the child takes us to some
extent out of the pre-linguistic period ; but it is advisable to con-
sider it at this point. In the first place we have to distinguish be-
tween what is learnt and what is comprehended. The child may
recite a series of numerical words that have been taught to him :
but so long as he fails to apply each term of the series correctly to
a number of corresponding objects, he does not understand it.
For the rest, this comprehension is only acquired slowly and at a
somewhat late period.
"The only distinction which the child makes at first is be-
tween the simple object and plurality. At eighteen months, he
distinguishes between one, two, and several. At the age of three,
or a little earlier, he knows one, two, and four (2X2). It is not
until later that he counts a regular series; one, two, three, four.
At this point he is arrested for some time. Hence the Brahmans
teach their pupils of the first class to count up to four only ; they
leave it to the second class to count up to twenty. In European
children of average intelligence, the age of six to seven years is re-
quired before they can count to ten, and about ten years to count
to one hundred. The child can doubtless repeat before this age a
numeration which it has been taught, but this is not what consti-
tutes knowledge of numbers ; we are speaking of determining
number by objects." ^ B. P^rez states that his personal observa-
tions have not furnished any indication contradictory to the asser-
tions of Houzeau. An intelligent child of two and a half was able
to count up to nineteen, but had no clear idea of the duration of
time represented by three days ; it had to be translated as follows :
"not to-day but to-morrow, and another to-morrow. "-'
This brings us back to the question, discussed in the last Open
Court, of the numeration claimed for animals. Preyer tells us of
one of his children that "it was impossible to take away one of his
ninepins without its being discovered by the child, while at eight-
een months he knew quite well whether one of his ten animals was
missing or not." Yet this fact is no proof that he was able to count
1 B. Perez, op. cit., 219. 2 Houzeau, oJ>. cit., II., 202.
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up to nine or ten. To represent to oneself several objects, and to
be aware that one of them is absent, and not perceived—is a dif-
ferent thing from the capacity of counting them numerically. If
the shelves of a library contain several works that are well known
to me, I can see that one is missing without knowing anything
about the total number of books upon the shelves. I have a juxta-
position of images (visual or tactile), in which a gap is produced.
For the rest, much light is thrown on this question by Binet's
ingenious experiments. Their principal result may be summarised
as follows.! A little girl of four does not know how to read or
count; she has simply learnt a few figures and applies them ex-
actly to one, two, or three objects ; above this she gives chance
names, say six or twelve, indifferently to four objects. If a group
of fifteen counters, and another group of eighteen, of the same
size, are thrown down on the table, without arranging them in
heaps, she is quick to recognise the most numerous group. The
two groups are then modified, adding now to the right, now to the
left, but so that the ratio fourteen to eighteen is constant. In six
attempts the reply is invariably exact. With the ratio seventeen-
eighteen, the reply is correct eight times, wrong once. If, how-
ever, the groups are found with counters of unequal diameter,
everything is altered. Some (green) measure two and one-half
centimetres, others (white) measure four centimetres. Eighteen
green counters are put on one side, fourteen white counters on the
other. The child then makes a constant error, and takes the latter
group to be the more numerous, and the group of fourteen may
even be reduced to ten without altering her judgment. It is not
until nine that the group of eighteen counters appear the more
numerous.
This fact can only be explained by supposing that the child
appreciates by space, and not by number, by a perception of con-
tinuous and not by discontinuous size—a supposition which agrees
with other experiments by the same author to the effect that, in
the comparison of lines, children can appreciate differences of
length. At this intellectual stage, numeration is accordingly very
weak, and restricted to the narrowest limits. As soon as these are
exceeded, the distribution between minus and plus rests, not upon
any real numeration, but upon a difference of mass, felt in con-
sciousness.
In children, reasoning prior to speech is, as with animals, prac-
tical, but well adapted to its ends. No child, if carefully watched,
1 Cf. Revue Philosophique, July, 1890.
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will fail to give proof of it. At seventeen months, Preyer's child,
which could not speak a word, finding that it was unable to reach
a plaything placed above its reach in a cupboard, looked about to
the right and left, found a small travelling trunk, took it, climbed
up, and possessed itself of the desired object. If this act be at-
tributed to imitation (although Preyer does not say this), it must
be granted that it is in imitation of a particular kind,—in no way
comparable with a servile copy, with repetition pure and simple,
—and that it contains an element of invention.
In analysing this fact and its numerous analogues, we became
aware of the fundamental identity of these simple inferences with
those which constitute speculative reasoning : they are of the same
character. Take, for instance, a scientific definition, such as that
of Boole, which seems at first sight little adapted to this connex-
ion. " Reasoning is the elimination of the middle term in a system
that has two terms." Notwithstanding its theoretical aspect, this
is rigorously applicable to the cases with which we are occupied.
Thus, in the mind of Preyer's child, there is a first term (desire
for the plaything), a last term (possession); the remainder is the
method, scaffolding, a mean term to be eliminated. The intellect-
ual process in both instances, practical and speculative, is iden-
tical ; it is a mediate operation, which develops by a series of acts
in animals and children, by a series of concepts and words in the
adult.
DEAF-MUTES.
In studying intellectual development prior to speech, the
group of deaf-mutes is sufficiently distinct from those which we
have been considering. Animals do not communicate all their se-
crets, and leave much to be conjectured. Children reveal only a
transitory state, a moment in the total evolution. Deaf-mutes
(those at least with whom we are dealing) are adults, comparable
as such to other men, like them, save in the absence of speech and
of what results from it. They have reached a stable mental state.
Moreover, those who are instructed at a late period, who learn a
language of analytical signs, i. e., who speak with their fingers, or
emit the sounds which they read upon the lips of others, are able
to disclose their anterior mental state. It is possible to compare
the same man with himself, before and after the acquisition of an
instrument of analysis. Subjective and objective psychology com-
bine to enlighten us.
The intellectual level of such persons is very low (we shall re-
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turn to this) : still their inferiority has been exaggerated, espe-
cially in the last century, by virtue of the axiom, it is impossible to
think without words. Discussion of this antique aphorism is un-
necessary; in its rigorous form it finds hardly any advocates of
note.^ Since thought is synonymous with comparing, abstracting,
generalising, judging, reasoning, i. e., with transcending in any
way the purely sensorial and affective life, the true question is not,
Do we think without words ? but, To what extent can we think
without words? Otherwise expressed, we have to fix the upper
limit of the logic of images, which evidently reaches its apogee in
adult deaf-mutes. Further, even in this last case, thought without
language does not attain its full development. The deaf-mute who
is left without special education, and who lives with men who have
the use of speech, is in a less favorable situation than if he forms
a society with his equals. G^rando, and others after him, re-
marked that deaf-mutes in their native state communicate easily
with one another. He enumerates a long series of ideas, which
they express in their mimicry, and gestures, and many of these ex-
pressions are identical in all countries.
"Children of about seven years old who have not yet been
educated, make use of an astonishing number of gestures and very
rapid signs in communicating with each other. They understana
each other naturally with great facility No one teaches them
the initial signs, which are, in great part, unaltered imitative move-
ments."
The study of this spontaneous, natural language is the sole
process by which we can penetrate to their psychology, and deter-
1 Max Miiller, however, is an exception. He has not made the smallest concession on this
point in any of his works, including the last {Three Introductory Lectures on the Science of
Thought. Chicago: The Open Court Publishing Co. I. He even maintains that a society of deaf
mutes would hardly rise above the intellectual level of a chimpanzee. "A man born dumb, not
withstanding his great cerebral mass and his inheritance of strong intellectual instincts, would
be capable of few higher intellectual manifestations than an orang or a chimpanzee, if he were
confined to the society of dumb associates " (p. 92). This thesis was attacked by thirteen critics,
including Romanes, Galton, the Duke of Argyle, etc., but Max Miiller meets them all and replies
to them without flinching. It must be confessed that the arguments invoked by his correspond-
ents are very unequal in merit. Some are convincing, others not. The Duke of Argyle says hap-
pily that " words are necessary to the progress of thought, but not at all to the act of thinking."
Ebbels (p. 13, appendix) shows that Max Miiller has unduly limited the question by excluding all
processes anterior to the formation of concepts; we think in images; the transition from one
form to another is imperceptible, and the faculty of abstraction does not appear suddenly along
with the signs. On the other hand, we cannot admit as evidence the facts invoked by other cor-
respondents, e. g., chess-players who combine and calculate solely by the aid of visual images ;
answers to letters, conceived in the first place as a general plan before they are developed in
words, etc. It is forgotten that the persons capable of these operations have had long practice
in verbal analysis, thereby attaining a high intellectual level. So, in the physical order, the prac-
tical gymnast, even when not executing any particular feat, possesses a suppleness and agility of
body, due to exercise, which translates itself into all his movements.
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mine their mode of thought. Like all other languages, it com-
prises a vocabulary and a syntax. The vocabulary consists in ges-
tures which designate objects, qualities, acts; these correspond to
our substantives and verbs. The syntax consists in the successive
order of these gestures and their regular arrangement; it trans-
lates the movement of thought and the effort towards analysis.
I. Vocabulary—Gerando collected about a hundred and fifty
signs, created by deaf-mutes living in isolation or with their fel-
lows. ^ A few of these may be cited as examples :
Child— Infantile gesture, of taking the breast, or being carried,
or rocking in the cradle.
Ox—Imitation of the horns, or the heavy tread, or the jaws
chewing the cud.
Dog—Movement of the head in barking.
Horse—Movements of the ears, or two figures riding horse-
back on another, etc.
Bird—Imitation of the beak with two fingers of the left hand,
while the other feeds it; or simulation of flight.
Bread—Signs of being hungry, of cutting, and of carrying to
the mouth.
Water—Exhibition of saliva, imitation of a rower, or of a man
pumping; accompanied always by the sign of drinking.
Letter (missive)—Gestures of writing and of sealing, or of un-
sealing and reading.
Monkeys, cocks, various trades (carpenter, shoemaker, etc.)
all designated by imitative gestures. For sleep, sickness, health,
etc., they employ an appropriate gesture.
For interrogation : expression of two contradictory proposi-
tions, and undecided glance towards the person addressed. This
is rather a case of syntax than of vocabulary; but a few signs may
be further indicated for some notions more abstract than the pre-
ceding.
Large—Raise the hand and look up.
Small—Contrary gestures.
Bad—Simulate tasting, and make grimace.
Number—Indicate with the help of the fingers; high numbers,
rapid opening^of the hand several times in succession.
1 Z?t? I'Education des sourds-muets, 2\'o\., 1827. Notwithstanding its somewhat remote date,
the book has lost none of its interest in this particular. It must also be remembered that institu-
tions for deaf-mutes are far more numerous now than at the beginning of the century, and that
the children are placed in them much earlier. Formerly they were abandoned to themselves or
instructed very late ; in proportion to their age, they presented better material for the study of
their development.
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Buy—Gesture of counting money, of giving with one hand,
and taking with the other.
Lose—Pretend to drop an object, and hunt for it in vain.
Forget—Pass the hand quickly across the forehead with a
shrug of the shoulders.
Love—Hold the hand on the heart (universal gesture).
Hate—Same gesture with sign of negation.
jPai-/—Throw the hand over the shoulder several times in suc-
cession.
Future—Indicate a distant object with the hand, repeated im-
itation of lying down in bed and getting up again.
It does not need much reflexion to see that all these signs are
abstractions as well as imitations. Among the different characters
of an object, the deaf-mute chooses one that he imitates by a ges-
ture, and which represents the total object. Herein he proceeds
exactly like the man who speaks. The difference is that he fixes
the abstract by an attitude of the body instead of by a word. The
primitive Aryan who denominated the horse, the sun, the moon,
etc., the rapid one, the shining one, the measurer (of months), did
not act otherwise; for him also, a chosen characteristic represents
the total object. There is a fundamental identity in the two cases;
thus justifying what was said above : abstraction is a necessary
operation of the mind, at least in man; he must abstract, because
he must simplify.
The inferiority of these imitative signs consists in their being
often vague, with a tendency to the opposite sense ; moreover,
since they are never detached completely from the object or the
act which they figure, and cannot attain to the independence of
the word, they are but very imperfect instruments of substitution.
II. Syntax—The mere fact of the existence of a syntax in the
language of the deaf-mutes proves that they possess a commence-
ment of analysis, i. e., that thought does not remain in the rudi-
mentary state. This point has been carefully studied by different
authors: Scott, Taylor, Romanes,^ who assign to it the following
characteristics :
1. It is a syntax of position. There are no "parts of speech,"
i. e., terms having a fixed linguistic function: substantive, adjec-
tive, verb, etc. The terms (gestures) borrow their grammatical
value from the place which they occupy in the series, and the rela-
tions between the terms are not expressed.
2. It is a fundamental principle that the signs are disposed in
ITylor, Early History of Mankind, p. 80. Romanes Mental Evolution in Man, Chapter VI
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the order of their relative importance, everything superfluous being
omitted.
3. The subject is placed before the attribute, the object (com-
plement) before the action, and, most frequently, the modified part
before the modifying.
Some examples will serve for the better comprehension of the
ordinary procedure of this syntax. To explain the proposition :
After running, I went to sleep, the order of gesture would be : to
run, me, finished, to sleep.—My father gave me an apple : apple,
father, me, give.—The active state is distinguished from the pas-
sive by its position: I struck Thomas with a stick ; me, Thomas,
strike, stick. The Abb^ Sicard, on asking a deaf-mute. Who cre-
ated God? obtained the answer: God created nothing. Though
he had no doubt as to the meaning of this inversion, he asked the
control question. Who makes shoes ? Answer, shoes makes cob-
bler.
The dry, bare character of this syntax is evident : the terms
are juxtaposed without relation ; it expresses the strictest neces-
sity only; it is the replica of a sterile, indistinct mode of thought.
Since we are endeavoring by its aid to fix an intellectual level,
it is not without interest to compare it with a syntax that is fre-
quent among the weak in intellect. ''These do not decline or con-
jugate; they employ a vague substantive, the infinitive alone, or
the past participle. They leave out articles, conjunctions, auxil-
iary verbs, reject prepositions, employ nouns instead of pronouns.
They call themselves "father," "mother," " Charles," and refer
to other people by indeterminate substantives, such as man,
woman, sister, doctor, etc. They invert the regular order of sub-
stantives and adjectives."^ Although this is a case of mental re-
gression, hence not rigorously comparable with a mind that is
sane but little developed, the mental resemblance between the two
syntaxes, and especially the absence of all expression of relations,
deserves to be signalised, because it cannot be the result of a for-
tuitous coincidence. It is the work of intellectual inferiority and
of relative discontinuity of thought.
There is little to say about numeration in deaf-mutes. When
untrained, they can count up to ten with the help of their fingers,
like many primitive people. Moreover (according to Sicard and
Gerando), they make use of notches upon a piece of wood or some
other visible mark.
To conclude, their mental feebleness, known since the days of
1 Kussmaul, Die Storungen der Sfirache, Chapter xxx.
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antiquity by Aristotle, by the Roman law which dispossessed them
of part of their civil rights, later on by many philosophers who re-
fused even to concede them memory, arises from their inaptitude
to transcend the inferior forms of abstraction and kindred opera-
tions. In regard to the events of ordinary life, in the domain of
the concrete (admitting, as is not always done, that there are indi-
vidual varieties, some being intelligent, and others stupid), deaf-
mates are sufficiently apt to seize and to comprehend the practical
connexion between complex things.^ But the world of higher con-
cepts, moral, religious, cosmological, is closed to them. Observa-
tions to this effect are abundant, though here again—as must be
insisted on—they reveal great individual differences.
Thus, a deaf-mute whose friends had tried to inculcate in him
a few religious notions, believed before he came under instruction
that the Bible was a book that had been printed in heaven by
workmen of Herculean strength. This was the sole interpretation
he gave to the gestures of his parents, who endeavored to make
him understand that the Bible contains a revelation, coming from
an all-powerful God who is in heaven.- Another who was taken
regularly to church on Sunday, and exhibited exemplary piety,
only recognised in this ceremony an act of obedience to the clergy.
There are many similar cases on record. Others on the contrary,
seek to inquire into, and to penetrate, the nature of things. W.
James ^ has published the autobiography of two deaf-mutes who
became professors, one at the asylum of Washington, the other in
California.
The principal interest attaching to the first is the spontaneous
appearance of the moral sense. After stealing small sums of
money from the till of a merchant, he accidentally took a gold
coin. Although ignorant of its value, he was seized with scruples,
feeling "that it was not for a poor man like him, and that he had
sXoX^vi too much.'" He got rid of it as best he could, and never
began again.
The other biography—from which we make a few brief ex-
1 Cf. as proof, the story related by Kussmaul [pp. cit., VII.) : A young deaf-mute was arrested
by the police of Prague as a vagabond. He was placed in an institution and questioned by suit
able methods, when he made known that his father had a mill with a house and surroundings
which he described exactly ; that his mother and sister were dead, and his father had remar-
ried ; that his step-mother had ill-treated him, and that he had planned an escape which had
succeeded. He indicated the direction of the mill to the east of Prague. Inquiries were made,
and all these statements were verified.
2 Romanes, Mental Evolution, etc., p. 150.
3 W. James, Psychology, I., 266, for the second observation ; Philosophical Review, I., No. 6, p.
613 et seq. for the first.
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tracts—may be taken as the type of an intelligent and curious deaf-
mute. He was not placed in an institution until he was eleven
years old. During his childhood he accompanied his father on
long expeditions, and his curiosity was aroused as to the origin of
things: of animals and vegetables, of the earth, the sun, the moon,
the stars (at eight or nine years). He began to understand (from
five years) how children were descended from parents, and how
animals were propagated. This may have been the origin of the
question he put to himself: whence came the first man, first ani-
mal, first plant, etc. He supposed at first that primaeval man was
born from the trunk of a tree, then rejected this hypothesis as ab-
surd, then sought in various directions without finding. He re-
spected the sun and moon, believed that they went under the
earth in the West, and traversed a long tunnel to reappear in the
East, etc. One day, on hearing violent peals of thunder, he inter-
rogated his brother, who pointed to the sky, and simulated the
zigzag of the lightning with his finger; when he concluded for the
existence of a celestial giant whose voice was thunder. Puerile as
they may be, are these cosmogonic, theological conceptions in-
ferior to those of the aborigines of Oceanica and of the savage re-
gions of South America, who, nevertheless, have a vocal idiom, a
rudimentary language ?
To sum up. That which dominates among the better gifted,
is the creative imagination : it is the culminating point of their in-
tellectual development. Their primitive curiosity does not seem
inferior to that of average humanity; but since they cannot get
beyond representation by images they lack an instrument of intel-
lectual progress.
